More Publications

Relationalism maintains that perceptual experience involves, as part of its nature, a distinctive kind of conscious perceptual relation between a subject of experience and an object of experience. Together with the claim that perceptual experience is presentational, relationalism is widely believed to be a core aspect of the naive realist outlook on perception. This is a mistake. I argue that naive realism about perception can be upheld without a commitment to relationalism.
European Journal of Philosophy

Philosophers and psychologists often assume that mirror reflections are optical illusions. According to many authors, what we see in a mirror appears to be behind it. I discuss two strategies to resist this piece of dogma. As I will show, the conviction that mirror reflections are illusions is rooted in a confused conception of the relations between location, direction, and visibility.
Philosophical Studies

Why did R.G. Collingwood come to reject the adversarial style of philosophical discussion so popular among his Oxford peers? The main aim of this paper is to explain that Collingwood came to reject his colleagues’ specific style of philosophical dialogue on methodological grounds, and to show how the argument against adversarial philosophical discussion is integrated with Collingwood’s overall criticism of realist philosophy. His argument exploits a connection between method and practice that should be taken seriously even today.
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 22(1), pp. 91-116


  • Mediated Objects of Perception

    People can directly apprehend objects in perception. They can also exploit intermediaries to perceive objects with which they are not in physical contact. By its sputter I can hear a distant car; through its foul odour I can smell the spoilt food. But how can the mind direct itself to something via something else? This project answers this question by investigating the intentionality of perception.

  • Philosophical Optics

    Current theories of vision hardly consider the findings and principles of optics, the study of light, or the properties of mirrors and media. This is because today it is assumed that the methods of the study of perception are those of psychology, or the cognitive sciences more broadly. In this project I show how both psychology and philosophy should give optics a more central place in the study of perception.


Recent & Upcoming

  • 'Philosophy in the Mirror' - Thursday, 22 Feb 2018
    Queens' College Mathematical Society : Cambridge

    PDF Slides

  • 'The Argument from Hallucination' - Monday, 22 Jan 2018
    Queens' College MCR-SCR Talks Series : Cambridge

  • 'Mere Appearances' - Friday, 8 Sep 2017
    Perception Workshop : Fribourg

  • 'Naive Realism without Relationalism' - Tuesday, 25 Jul 2017
    Workshop on the Philosophy of Perception : Tübingen

  • 'Suitable Objects of Experience' - Wednesday, 21 Jun 2017
    Micro-Conference Philosophy and Perception : Queens' College, Cambridge


Course outlines & handouts

Earlier courses