More Publications

Philosophers and psychologists often assume that mirror reflections are optical illusions. According to many authors, what we see in a mirror appears to be behind it. I discuss two strategies to resist this piece of dogma. As I will show, the conviction that mirror reflections are illusions is rooted in a confused conception of the relations between location, direction, and visibility.
Philosophical Studies

Why did R.G. Collingwood come to reject the adversarial style of philosophical discussion so popular among his Oxford peers? The main aim of this paper is to explain that Collingwood came to reject his colleagues’ specific style of philosophical dialogue on methodological grounds, and to show how the argument against adversarial philosophical discussion is integrated with Collingwood’s overall criticism of realist philosophy. His argument exploits a connection between method and practice that should be taken seriously even today.
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 22(1), pp. 91-116


  • Mediated Objects of Perception

    People can directly apprehend objects in perception. They can also exploit intermediaries to perceive objects with which they are not in physical contact. By its sputter I can hear a distant car; through its foul odour I can smell the spoilt food. But how can the mind direct itself to something via something else? This project answers this question by investigating the intentionality of perception.

  • Philosophical Optics

    Current theories of vision hardly consider the findings and principles of optics, the study of light, or the properties of mirrors and media. This is because today it is assumed that the methods of the study of perception are those of psychology, or the cognitive sciences more broadly. In this project I show how both psychology and philosophy should give optics a more central place in the study of perception.


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